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Interval dilation in mind disconnections
- On Minds’ Localization

This particular relationship between such physical instants and mental mo-ments, namely about 1041 times, may be a relativistic dilation generated by moving close to a speed equal to c minus a 10-82 fraction of c. Further circumstances sug-gest that this possibility should be seriously considered.

9. Besides this time acuity proper of the attentional focus of an awake mind, we observe states of inattention, sleep and coma that are usually interpreted as loses of consciousness or, in the case of inattention, as a decrease in the sensed objects’ “force of imposition”. As an academic expression, the latter is a wording that ac-quired some biomedical denotations following its origin in phenomenological introspection5 and might require explanation: what is in the focus of attention allows one to be mindful of all that one knows that could be done with it (i.e., its defining “concept”), while what is outside of the attentional focus is minded as if one’s op-erative possibilities in its regard had been abridged into a referential block, like substituting a complicated term in equations by a single letter or a simple sign. This state of the fully sensed but faintly apperceived objects is the decrease in their op-erational recognition in which the reduction of their force of imposition consists. It, as well as the “losses of consciousness” (sleep, general anesthesia, coma), may manifest variations in the resolutive power or acuity, caused by variations in the said relativistic dilation – not wholly unlike playing an old phonograph record at the wrong speed.

10. On the other hand, during the last four decades or so mentation has been re-ported to occur in all electroencephalographic stages of sleep6, 7, 8, 9, from falling asleep to waking, suggesting that during deep sleep no “loss” or temporary cessa-tion of mind occurs. This observation, in the context being examined, allows us to conjecture that inattention consists of modifying the mind’s resolutive power of the brain’s sectorial states that generate the unattended sensations, while in turn sleep, swoon and coma involve an application more intense and widely spread (e. g., over an entire hemisphere or the whole brain) of the same mechanism. It could be achieved and regulated by way of decreasing the fraction of c speed which is sub-tracted from c for physiologically setting the velocity of the particles where the causal involvements of minds find their most immediate localization, namely the velocity of the action carriers exerting the Newtonian force observed to modify the path of the biospheric relaxation process. This increment in speed would change the dilation of the physical instant, from some 1041 times to 1045 times or more, pre-venting the observer from resolving several minutes or more in extramental se-quences, while her or his own time remains unaltered. 11. To establish any verisimilitude in this conjecture, the mode of recovering from traumatic amnesia in neuropsychiatric patients was expressly observed, benefiting from the large quantity of cases in one of the institutions with which the present author is affiliated. No novel findings surfaced and in most cases the anterograde amnesia was indistinguishable from the effects of inattention, the recovery appear-ing as compatible with what could be described as reacquisition of the ability of put-ting and retaining at will the focus of attention on any sector of experience.

12. Other common observations are also congruent with viewing time acuity or re-solutive power as the brain-dependent factor gating the observer’s connection and disconnection with the surroundings, in such a way that sleep, swoon, comas, and similar states could disconnect minds from the environment by varying the mind’s time-resolution of the brain’s neurodynamical sequences – the brain generating this disconnecting variation by altering the relativistic dilations created by the speed of the force carriers where minds find their most immediate localization. One of such observations is that, while dreamt sensations are being sensed those sensations coming from the sense organs are not. A dream-originated fa note is sensed but the same dreamer does not sense a fa note from the external world neurodynami-cally enacted in the same brain. In the discussed scenario, this is exactly what should occur because the first sensations become stirred by neuroactivity patterned with the resolution of extramental time sequences of a dreaming mind, while the second ones are stirred by neuroactivity that remains patterned with the resolution of extramental time employed to keep track of the outer processes of biological relevance.

In the same scenario, perceived features “fade” due to inattention by alter-ing the relativistic dilations created by the speed of those force carriers in the brain areas that are generating features of which the mind is to become inattentive. When “paying” attention to something, what is contributed is the operationalizing of its sensations. One thereby applies, to a sector of one’s sensory field, the acquired system of equilibrable operations sedimented in one’s mind. And neuroactivity is expected to lack mental concomitants when the time-structure of its patterns is not also conserved in the dynamics of the physical field in whose force carriers minds find their most immediate localization. Thus, in this outlook, inattention causes am-nesia by texturing the mind with contents whose time “graining” is not resolvable in the time-resolution of the mind’s available operational combinations that conserve the object. Sleeping right after learning, in this perspective, is thus better for reten-tion than remaining awake because the organization of memories reflects the time-resolution in which the original experiences were lived: every time-resolution allows reimagining the experiences from different time-resolutions, but just as unattended context. Thus sleep prevents the ensuing waking life from intervening and sleep mentation – physiologically supported on a different time resolution – does not it-self interfere. The same specific mechanism is also expected (a) to prevent remem-bering most sleep mentation after awakening; (b) to dissociate the ease of access or “handiness” of awake rememberings from oneiric threads (and of oneiric epi-sodes from awake decisions); (c) to put distractions before forgetting at the begin-ning of dementedness processes; (d) to confer status epilepticus more proclivity to anterograde than to retrograde amnesia; and (e), in traumatic memory deficits, to make depend the recall of the pretraumatic (retrograde) portion of life, forgotten in a mnesic lacuna or memory “lagoon,” on the same lacuna’s postraumatic (antero-grade) portion or “amnesia of fixation” period. In all these cases, in the scenario thus far outlined, the biographical episodes lived from a certain time dilation can no longer be operatively categorized in full when the relativistic speed state, of the biophysical components that form their experiencer’s immediate circumstance, changes into another relativistic speed state.

The condition in which the brain does not tune its electroneurobiology so as to furnish proper time dilation to sensory experiences is understood to result, therefore, in a condition similar to that involved in the fading, into “distraction,” of many memories of the habitual life lived in the months or years after a catastrophic bereavement. At their occurrence one perceives the sensory experiences just as one perceives scarcely attended-to vehicle and pedestrian traffic around the bus in which one travels. These scarcely attended-to vehicles and pedestrians are well seen, heard and identified in some incipient detail but soon, even perhaps before one gets out of the bus, one cannot put their perceptions in any order so as to re-call their presentation. The same occurs to all the life episodes lived in some (often transient) postconcussive stages. Such a process is called “distraction” when it in-trudes on one´s plans, e. g. when, while reading, one plays a disc with many songs and sometimes finds that the songs which one most expected to hear are finishing, have been “heard,” yet their memory – though recent – is irretrievable. In order to arouse the affects and emotions one wished to obtain from the audition they should be played anew – and listened to without reading. Preventing it is why, illustra-tively, theaters impose silence and darken the seating precisely when performances commence. It should be plain that in the discussed scenario “distraction” is what in clinical contexts is called “fixation amnesia” or anterograde amnesia, namely diffi-culties in learning new information. In the beginning of dementias it precedes the older memories’ unreimaginability (forgetting), and in the outlined scenario the same mechanism also conditions the possibilities of awake and dreaming states for reciprocal recall. In sleep mentation it is also to bring about the “attentional nar-rowing,” the thematic or experiential reduction that impoverishes one’s full experi-ence, shrinking the menu of other experiences that one keeps available for collation with the actual contents of a dreamt thread in such a way that – above and beyond more specific cognitional effects – while dreaming we are habitually unaware that we are in fact in a dreamworld. On the same basis, it also is to set the distribution, over the sleep period, of the dreams that include “diurnal rests.”

Disparities in the force of imposition, in view of the hints suggested by the observations under commentary, are to reflect not absolute but proportional dis-parities in resolution. This is suggested by the also common observation that the experiences that closely precede powerful emotions, although acquired with un-weakened force of imposition, are as likely to be forgotten as those of the enthrall-ing emotional event’s experiential margin, which, instead, faded into “distraction” at acquisition time. Such disparities so may make that people awakened after having slept for more than a very short period cannot typically recall the last few minutes before they fell asleep, and also make people prone to forget phone calls or ex-changes which they have had in the middle of the night, or the alarm’s ringing in the morning if one fell immediately to sleep after turning it off. In this setting, ac-quisition with decreased force of imposition is also the reason why, of the memories “diluted” by anterograde amnesia, no recovery is observed similar to the gradual reinstatement of pretrauma memories common with retrograde amnesia.

Table 1 (p. 257) shows several further observations in clinical and neuro-cognitive sciences congruent with the portrayed scenario.

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