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Biology Articles » Neurobiology » On Minds’ Localization » Reciprocal constraints of separate findings

Reciprocal constraints of separate findings
- On Minds’ Localization

In a dozen independent academic fields, hints have recently surfaced whose combination suggests that the unknown localization of minds in nature features cer-tain characteristics, the most remarkable of which is motion. It comes from the fol-lowing observations:

1. Genetic epistemology is generally considered a branch of psychology, chiefly de-veloped in the last three quarters of the 20th century by the efforts of the biologist-psychologist Jean Piaget1, 2 and many collaborators. Their work shows that minds achieve intellectual development through behavioral probing of reality, not through its Platonic contemplation. The focus of the minds’ description thus shifted onto the origination of probing actions, or initiatives, a feature distinguishing minds from non-minds and discussed below. Whatever it is that senses, it proceeds as if en-closed in a supple bag: in this case, only by taking initiatives, i.e. by palpating the bag’s wall, can it recognize what is invariantly conserved outside and, so, build a mental map or picture of the surrounding happenings.

2. Evolution of living systems, one of the most notable dynamical phenomena of nature, is a physical relaxation process. As such, it should move on a shortest path amid environmental circumstances whose variety on Earth may be consid-ered quite constant since at least Late Proterozoic times.

3. Combination of the preceding observations suggests that minds are not epiphenomenal but do efficiently act in the surroundings, collectively behaving as a physical force that – also because the assemblage of mind-guided actions is never fully adapted or identically conformed to biological usefulness – modifies the shortest path of the biosphere’s evolutionary relaxation process. By differently setting its minimal trajectory, minds act as a Newtonian force, observed in their biological effects which include stretching the trophic chains and anthropogenic perturbations.

4. This implies that the mentioned mind’s initiatives – whereby minds acquire in-tellectual development – are variations, in quantity or distribution of the motion they originate, as an effect of internal forces. It is upon this feature that biological evolution functionalizes, or uses as a means, the regular appearings of existential-ities (or subjective existences, or psyches) for overcoming the limitations of Tur-ing machines, which are unable to convert accidents into opportunities. This func-tion is for some organisms the foremost among the so called “functions of relation with the environment,” or functions of relation for short. For nourishing, defending and reproducing themselves most biological organizations operate as Turing ma-chines, namely as contrivances that cast step by step their outcomes’ string. As such do function, e.g., corals, oysters, and tropical plants, all of which are usually construed as not mind-regulated living creatures. These biological organizations solve their problems upon species-specific preadaptations; namely, all their func-tions of relation are preset. So, oysters solve these problems of how to nourish, defend and reproduce by basing their particular solutions on species-specific preadaptations, instead of minding of the situations they should cope with. In contrast, by refining the adaptation or adequacy of the provided solutions, in the biological organisms called “mind-regulated animals” – each of which uses a mind as its uppermost regulatory level – the individual existentiality that confronts a concrete problem does this, and grasps at many of the opportunities that a Turing machine would have lost. The mind’s continual forwarding of initiatives – the mentioned probings “through the bag’s wall” – that allows their Piagetian intellec-tual development physically requires that minds’ specific actions belong with an interaction modality, whose action carriers should be those of the Newtonian force observed to influence the path of the biosphere’s evolutionary relaxation process.

5. On the other hand, clinical observations show recoveries from amnesias. This old observation, in the recently acquired scenario thus far outlined, entails that memories are not engraved data, which – in spite of the fact that the name cere-brum implies the engraving metaphor – could not be recovered after loss. The mentioned findings of genetic epistemology require that any recovery after a genuine loss be achieved by way of building anew the intellectual which is manifestly not the case of recovered patients. This suggests that the re-coveries from amnesias should not be deemed recoveries of genuinely lost mental contents, but reacquisitions of the brain’s ability to have them reimagined.

6. Far from the study of amnesias on the academic map, physical studies on the origin of inertial mass have been as yet inconclusive but most physicists agree that this mass comes from outside onto elementary particles which by themselves are massless3. Although we are unaware of the mechanism4, it is observed that some particles hold a certain amount of mass and others none. This situation al-lows time processes to spread up from microphysical scales, i.e. the force fields’ action carriers can thereby arrange structures that evolve in scales larger than microphysical.

7. But this process has not been found to organize the internal differentiations of minds, or mental contents. This suggests that such time processes do not course inside minds and anything that achieves sensed or known differentiations “sedi-ments” them as its memories, altering itself by sedimenting away from time its causal involvements. “Away from time” means “not on time courses but inside the instant,” which instant is where such reality which knows – as well as the whole of nature – occurs and simultaneizes the sedimented sequences (“memories”) of its reactions to its causal interactions. This is tantamount to saying that whichever re-ality that knows itself ought to possess memory of what it knowingly differentiates; namely that, because nature vacates itself outside actuality and so every thing and process in nature, including each mind, only exists within the physical instant, the preservation of memories is an effect of the absence of time course, not of the presence of brain engrams. To put it still otherwise, it means that, in the same way that impetus is superfluous to keeping unperturbed bodies in geodesic motion, en-graving such memories in the brain is superfluous to keeping them in mind. 8. The interval-like duration of the physical instant, or time-like period in which no physical action could ever insert a change, is unknown. Many physicists are sympathetic toward the view that identifies it as the Planck instant, but in present nature no separate force, or interaction modality whose relationships enter to de-fine the Planck instant, can produce a change before a “characteristic time” of some 1020 Planck instants or more: every transformation in time is, thus, cur-rently ticked on intervals always larger than this one. In contrast, it is observed that moments, the least interval which an awake mind can distinguish or resolve and during which no mental action can be done, have a magnitude of the order of the hundredth of a second, about 1041 Planck instants.development,


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