As mentioned, to obtain nourishment, defense and sex recombination, bio-logical organisms enact their distinctive menus of relationships with the external world by performing what is called their “functions of relation.” Distinguishing any particular external thing or sector to be acted or reacted upon (object) from the rest of the environment, while allowing for its relevant relations with this environ-ment (mapping), is termed a “reference to object.” It was once thought that, for the functions of relation to make reference to objects and map them, a nervous system was requisite. Nervous systems, for that reason, became conceived as hav-ing started with cellular specialization; that is, with the evolutionary selection of surface cells specialized in detecting and cooperatively communicating the presence of relevant objects to other bodily cells specialized in adaptively dealing with them. Though functional, this criterion accentuated the primacy of anatomical distinctions: the nervous systems were assumed to have started with the functional diversity that made neurosensory cells different from other cells – specially from motor cells. Otherwise stated, it was thought that the natural selection of paths (hodologies, or neural nets) for nerve activity supplied the physical processes to which minds can react by intonating themselves subjectively. But the story is incorrect. Already in the acellulars from which all animals derive, far before any cell differentiation and presumably any subjectivity, the functions of relation made reference to objects.
These acellulars distinguished from the rest of a mapped environment the particular thing or sector to be acted or reacted upon. A good example is provided by hunters like Didinium nasutum which exhibits an insatiable appetite for parame-cia. Propelled by its girdles of cilia, barrel-shaped Didinium attacks paramecia horn first. Rapidly whirling through the water, it then maneuvers its prey into a position in line with its cytostome, ingesting the prey by opening its cytostome and swallow-ing it whole. Didinium can swallow paramecia twice its size, and can repeat this re-markable performance as many as a dozen times a day. Ciliophora, thus, for over more than a thousand million years have fed because the mechanism that controls cilia reorientates them or their water currents toward fast swimming preys and edi-ble floating crumbs. As the means for attaining reference to objects, in the last phase of the chase they utilized electric field patterns probably composed at the de-formation of the distribution of submembrane potential fluctuations – resulting from the automatically coordinated ciliary beating – by the viscous contact of the ciliary rows with a floating piece or the hydrostatic waves from also ciliated preys. These means disappeared in many animal lineages, which instead formed nervous ganglia as their uppermost level of organic regulation. Those means, on the contrary, were preserved during the process of nervous path concentration that formed brains, such organs looking like a feltwork of fibers in a soup of enzymes11 but also tapping mind interactions. The electropotential system for ciliary control was kept in the descendents that in their larval stages (“dipleurula” 12, 13, 14) had the cilia around the “mouth”, i.e. in the ciliary band and the apical organ. From the cells support-ing these cilia, our nervous system comes. In it we still retain not only the cilia but, also, gene sequences such as the one called onecut 15, which, anatomically, initiate the nervous system “above” what is to become the buccal cavity in our early embryos.
As a result, always in the discussed scenario, the brain organs that nowa-days carry out the chordate’s uppermost level of organic regulation include neural ganglia that subserve a specific, connectivity-based function, which is not the up-permost regulatory function of the organism: the neural ganglia embedded in each chordate brain do hodologically enact unmindful behavior through refined sensomo-tor archs that lack any memory of particular objects. As another result of the same course of events brains also include the said electric field means. They perform an-other specific function. These electric means furnish the therein circumstanced mind both with exchanges to which to intonatively react and, also, with a pathway for ecphoria, i.e. for causally chaining some extramental processes to mental op-erations. Further, these very electric field means, by way of making relativistic ef-fects assume specific values at the locations of the mind-extramentality causal ex-changes, enact variations in time resolution that modulate the mind’s intonative re-actions, while the mind’s retentiveness (in the context under commentary, no rea-son appears for assuming that memories could succumb to time) supplies a mem-ory of particular objects in terms of their operative characterization. By that means individual intellectual developments are enabled within the biosphere - whereupon the regular eclosions of never regular minds get placed within the causal organiza-tion of behaving organisms, as their uppermost regulatory level. Thereby, it is not through the hodologies or circuitry of the neural ganglia embedded in the brain, that these organisms become able to surmount the Turing machine limits and, so, colonize biological niches where transforming accidents into opportunities is requi-site for survival.