Login

Join for Free!
118246 members
table of contents table of contents

This article examines neurobiological and clinical observations that may be considered direct – …


Biology Articles » Neurobiology » Effects of relativistic motions in the brain and their physiological relevance » Synopsis of the major themes

Synopsis of the major themes
- Effects of relativistic motions in the brain and their physiological relevance

 

Any comprehensive theory about the psyches found in nature needs to account for basic issues, including those in the following list of questions and answers. For the sake of simplicity, this succinct list will often indulge in calling such psyches "minds", thus taking a part as the whole. The answers draw on the concepts of our tradition and will be discussed in more detail later in the article. The present synoptic exposition is very compact and some specialized concepts are introduced fairly pithily, simply to introduce a previously unfamiliar neurobiological picture.

 

(1) What are minds?

The realities transforming in time based on a selection of their antecedents rather than all of them.

 

(2) What precisely is it that minds do?

A semovient refocusing of attention. When this refocusing is causally linked with the body, voluntary behavior occurs.

 

(3) Where are the actions of minds localized in nature?

In the force carriers of a physical field, whence minds can start behavior and sensorily react to changes in these force carriers.

 

(4) In what kind of physical building blocks do minds find their most immediate localization?

In the physical force carriers whose characteristics generate the observed relativistic dilations of interval units, or time "graining."

 

(5) Can brain changes erase episodic and praxical memories, regardless of their time "graining" or patterning interval units?

No, because things with memory (minds) and anything else in nature co-occur in time but for one single instant. Because such instantaneous co-occurrence no causal transformation (time) elapses, and time changes macroscopic situations because of certain physical circumstances (connected with the acquisition of inertial mass) that are not known to take place in the minds, no thing with knowledge of its inner differentiations (memories) may lose their availability as a result of a causal transformation (time) obliterating or erasing them.

 

(6) By what means do sleep, faintings, comas, and similar states disconnect minds from their surroundings?

By varying the mind's time-resolution of the brain's neurodynamical sequences. The brain generates this disconnecting variation by altering the relativistic dilations created by the speed of the force carriers where minds find their most immediate extramental localization.

 

(7) For what reason are dreamt sensations perceived while simultaneous sensations coming from the sense organs are not perceived?

Because the first ones are patterned with the resolution of extramental time sequences of a dreaming mind, while the second ones remain patterned with the resolution of extramental time employed to keep track of the outer processes of biological relevance.

 

(8) How do perceived features fade due to inattention?

By altering the relativistic dilations created by the speed of those force carriers in the brain areas that are generating features of which the mind is to become inattentive.

 

(9) How are voluntary movements attentionally determined?

By attentional refocusing that alters the density of force carriers - of the physical field where one's existentiality finds its most immediate extramental localization; all force-fields redistribute their potentials by way of altering the local density of its carriers - in the brain areas causally linked to one's selected organs.

 

(10) Once they have been recalled and given attention to, where do memories again fade into?

When no longer re-imagined (i.e., no longer replicated in imagination) and also while their reimagining was neurophysiologically enacted, memories remain as operational combinations differentiated in the mind's ontic consistency, and as such are constitutive segments of it.

 

(11) How does inattention cause amnesia?

By texturing the mind's ontic consistency with contents whose time "graining" is not resolvable in the time-resolution of the mind's available operational combinations that conserve the object.

 

(12) When is neuroactivity non-conscious?

When the time-sequence of its (electromagnetic) patterns is not also conserved in the dynamics of the (other, non-electromagnetic) physical field in whose force carriers minds find their most immediate localization.

 

(13) How are memories semoviently recalled and recognized as one's own?

By semoviently combining equilibrable operations, until arriving to focus attention on the same possibility of combining equilibrable operations that one had during an originally lived episode. Inasmuch as this recalling operation is defined by one's constitutive operatory possibilities that make its elements recognizable or understandable for oneself, it may be replicated in imagination any number of times.

 

(14) Why is sleeping right after learning better for retention than remaining awake?

Because the organization of memories reflects the time-resolution in which the original experiences were lived: every time-resolution allows reimagining the experiences from different time-resolutions, but just as unattended context. Thus, sleep prevents the ensuing waking life from intervening, and sleep mentation - physiologically supported on a different time resolution - does not itself interfere, thereby providing a protection of studied content that is unavailable for contents learned without sleep interlude.

 

(15) What is imparted when one pays attention to something?

The operationalizing of its sensations. Thereby one applies to a sector of one's sensory field the acquired system of equilibrable operations sedimented in one's ontic-ontological consistency.

 

(16) Does the overlap of time resolutions automatically generate recall?

No; the effect of time acuity on memory is not direct. It affects recall only inasmuch as the proper matching of the time acuities - those of the original acquisition and its current knowledge - allows applying the system of equilibrable operations included at recall time in the mind's ontological consistency. Such application can be forestalled by other circumstances; for example, if the original acquisition occurred before the system of equilibrable operations is developed (infantile amnesia).

 

(17) What is voluntary recall?

Voluntary recall, also called conative recall, is the semovient act of retrieving a particular memory originally acquired at a previous time. On gnoseologically recognizing its operational structure, the intended memory is reimagined by setting up, most likely with intervention of the frontal lobes, a dynamic electroneurobiological state whose tuning normally involves different brain structures than these lobes. This electroneurobiological state first is to match the time acuity with which the memory was originally experienced; then second generate, in the circumstanced mind and through coupling with the physical field where all circumstanced minds find their immediate localization, sensory reactions (intonations, phosphene-like phenomenology) structured to match the particular memory as it was previously identified in her "visio generalis" (when selecting it for recall); and third, is then semoviently used to modify the reimagination process upon operative equilibria that conserve the particular memory as object of these modifications, thus recognizable through them.

 

(18) What is gnoseological apprehension?

Gnoseological apprehension in general, that is, any act of knowing or noetic act independently of who the performing mind is, is the feature of efficiently causal interactions whereby the enacted structureless reactions intonate the reacting entity on ranges whose manifestation exhausts these interactions' causal efficiency.

 

(19) Assuming a plausible understanding of causation, how can privately accessible mental events cause or be caused by non-privately accessible physical events?

Because efficient causation for and across mental and physical events is the very same. The mind-brain causally efficient interaction is not more perplexing than the field generation of variations in local potentials. To set in motion a course of regular extramental effects usually called "voluntary behavior," minds establish, as initial causal link, the local potentials of the non-electromagnetic field whose carriers are utilized to start extramental actions. In so launching this causal series, every circunstanced mind does the same that all segregated fields do when, from an unlocalizable set of determinations, they make themselves either "pop out" more, or less of its force carriers at every spot of volume, thereby changing the spatial distribution of their potential. In turn, on the same efficient causality, in setting up sensations this immediate field generates intonative reactions in the circumstanced mind. The actual problem does not consist in the interactions, but in why a mind ecloses to sense and move her brain rather than another.

 

(20) What is restored on recovery from ordinary sleep, hibernation, general anesthesia, "absence," fainting, coma, or vegetative states?
While the preservation of memories is an effect of the absence of time course, their modifiable reimagining is an effect that exploits the presence of brain structures (utilized to "flesh" memories with new sensory intonations). For clinical practice, this means that the issue of "impaired consciousness" amounts to controlling the tissue's electroneurobiological activity that gates the proper acuity and thus restores the time-resolutive matching. This allows for "coupling" or "switching on" the body in order to "awaken" the finite mind who had eclosed there.


rating: 3.56 from 18 votes | updated on: 7 Sep 2008 | views: 8025 |

Rate article:







excellent!bad…