Let me expand this score of nutshells that condense the basic themes:
What are Psyches? Past and future situations only arise in the context of minds. They do not exist outside of psyches, namely out of what is envisaged or represented by means of differentiations (minds) acquired by "consciousnesses" or psyches: extramen-tally, that is, outside of minds, only present situations occur; not past and future ones. Past and future situations are only imagined, in a simplified way and diversely for sure. In this way - namely, by their being imagined now - their reality or ontic consistency is in fact a part of the present situation; in this it exhausts itself. In other words, past and future situations lack any other relevance for extramental reality, since they are neither found, nor do they cause effects, except as assemblages of mental contents envisaged by psyches. Thus, all nature is actual only at a given instant, and each present situation determines its own time transformation; nonexistent situations cannot causally deter-mine any transformation whatsoever. In this context, a cornerstone of familiar-scale physics is that, because aside from quantum concerns any indeterminacy in it is found to apply to future events, when determining each next transformation the actual or last situation is tantamount to its entire preceding history. In contrast, minds change quite differently: souls, minds, existentialities, or psyches are the realities that transform themselves only on a selection of their respective antecedents, not necessarily on all of them. This is the objective definition of the mind-including "consciousnesses" or psyches in general, as it is accepted in the Argentine neurobiological tradition. In contrast, the things situated amid finite "consciousnesses" or psyches (or things that compound the hylozoic hiatus, namely all extramentalities such as winds, rocks, fungi, trees, and com-puters, for which a variation in quantity or distribution of motion cannot occur as an ef-fect of internal forces) inevitably use all of their history, tantamount to the last situation, to transform themselves as time elapses. Thus while all their yesterdays pack into their now, all our tomorrows are ours to shape. In finding the brute fact of this selection, phys-ics finds in nature the gnoseological apprehension and semovience enacting it. Both are found to come conjointly, in discrete circumstanced eclosions, whose efficient actions and reactions become set as the natural phenomena we as natural scientists are trying to describe and understand.
As remarked below, this knowledge or gnoseological apprehension grasps certain phe-nomenal reactions, namely intonations of the self-knowing being, which cause to discon-tinue the outer causal series that had led to them. Such a series of efficient causal de-terminations comes to an end by producing intonative reactions, that is, phosphene-like manifestations that are both phenomenal (that is, in which a sensation is known) and in-efficient to continue the series. Therefore, the emplacement of circumstanced existen-tialities in nature is found whenever a break affects some efficient causal chain. The last link of this chain phenomenizes as the reaction of a self-knowing being, a reaction that becomes gnoseologically apprehended but lacks causal efficiency to further its preced-ing causal series. One aptitude excludes the other, both being discrete capabilities fea-tured by efficient causation. As empirically found, outer causal efficiency can work out intonative reactions in psychisms, but it cannot cause psychisms to be affected in such a way as to instrumentally transmit the outer efficiency. Minds do not behave as billiard balls. Any causal consequence from this outer efficiency is thus to be a new causal string semoviently originated by the causal efficiency of the same self-knowing being that did the gnoseological apprehension, and selected it as causal antecedent rather than deselecting it, or else adjusted it contextually to posit it as causal antecedent. Such events do not happen in the hylozoic hiatus, where all of the causal series continue (i.e., all causal efficiency is transeunt, matter-energy is conserved over effects) but, in trade, there is no gnoseological apprehension. In other words, by coming to gnoseo¬logical ap-prehension, the causal series that led toward the intonative reaction cannot continue any longer; a semovient enactment of the efficient causality of the same self-knowing reality is now needed to start another causal series, which may enact continuity with or departure from the route of the former causal series.
What precisely is it that minds do? Classical - not quantum - physics, accordingly, finds minds to be those realities that affirm, for their own transformation in time, a selection of nonexistent (past and future) situations. The finding occurs in view of the fact that notic-ing these nonexistent situations, a noticing that is gnoseological apprehension, is a pre-requisite for such a selection. The affirmation of a selection is "semovient," a term so far barely outlined. It means that such affirmation starts a novo, or from scratch, new causal series that transform the ontic makeup or consistency of the selecting and affirming psy-che, thereby also transformatively affecting and changing its causally linked extramen-talities - that is, brain, body (or a neuroprosthesis, discussed below), and some of its surroundings. Because of that semovience, mind-differentiating psyches active at a break in efficient causal chains have been evolutionarily selected as a means to achieve determinations in mechanically undecidable situations. Nevertheless, this singularity (namely, the inauguration of new causal series of events instead of merely continuing older series, as mindless things do) is not relevant for attempting to localize in brains the actions of finite consciousnesses or psyches.
Where are the Actions of Psyches Localized in Nature? Semovient action is causally as efficacious in nature as the nomic or regular actions of mindless entities, such as rocks and chemicals, that continue transformative series instead of inaugurating them. In the physical sciences' description of the universe, a basic piece of information is that all effi-caciously transforming causal agents in nature (Newton's "forces") are localized at what behaves as some species of discrete force carriers, sometimes called "force vectors." Force carriers appear as microscopic packets of force that propagate their causal effi-cacy with some inherent characteristics. Therefore, the organic localization of the ac-tions of psyches (not their ontic consistency but their local causal exchange with extra-mentality, or operative presence) can be pinpointed as the carrier particles that classical physics finds as the Newtonian force inflecting, or curving, the shortest path of bio-spheric evolution. Such a force does this, that is, affects the natural scenery on Earth, through the implementation of sensuality, including, for example, the lengthening of tro-phic chains through animal nutrition and reproduction under environmental demands undefinable for behavioral pre-programming, and the countless human endeavors whose effects on the biosphere are called "anthropogenic perturbations." Among the lat-ter's instances, not seldom ugly, one might rather recall that flowers and fruits co-evolve meeting pollinators' and disseminators' sensual preferences, of which of late the human ones became important. In conclusion: working as a force, the action of mind-differentiating psyches is localized in nature in a certain kind of force carriers.
In What Kind of Physical Building Blocks do Psyches Find Their Most Immediate Local-ization? Like all other force carriers, the mind-exchanges-localizing "particles" are to possess specific speed-determining features. A key one is bulkiness. Without a small inertial mass, each force carrier would be forced to move at exactly light speed, being completely unable to vary its rapidity. Bulkiness limits the force carriers' speed and makes it different from c. Speed is crucial, because the magnitude taken by the speed of these "particles" expands relativistically (that is, spreads according to relativity physics) the "thickness" of the physical instant - the interval-like span "during" which all causation ought to stay non-transformative - into the time resolution or acuity of the individual gnoseological apprehension whose causal exchanges are localized in such quickly propagating "particles" or action packets. In other words, a minimal extramental interval unit (or "instant") is, in this way, dilated into a minimal experienced interval unit (or "mo-ment"). This relativistic dilation, technically expressed by the Lorentz-FitzGerald and the Valatin-Bogoljubov transforms, delivers across different motion-frames the features of a unique causal efficiency.
Such a dilation is observed to be ~1041 times, a magnitude specified by the velocity of these particles. (Of course, in case that the modulus of transformational change is taken to be different from that of the Planck instant - for example, taking as "primitive" the transition time of some modality of interaction, all of which modalities in the currently ob-servable universe take more than ~1019 Planck instants - this specification of absolute speeds for achieving the proper time dilations will proportionally vary: a dilation of about 1020 times would suffice. The scenario, and the physical means at play, subsist never-theless anyway, and so to avoid needless complications this article will provisionally as-sume the Planck instant as modulus of transformational change.) This speed, slightly less than light's, is determined by the very small inertial mass or invariant bulkiness of these particles, which makes them slower than light, and the dynamical mass-modulating, coupling effect of the overlapping electromagnetic field, whose potentials are diversely modulated by the physiological state in the diverse brain regions and, cor-respondingly, modulate the speed of these particles where the observer's interactions are localized. To be precise, the velocity that creates this dilation corresponds to sub-tracting from light speed an extremely tiny fraction, only about 1/1082 of light speed; I will use from now on the standard notation, indicating that it subtracts from light speed a 10-82 fraction. This speed may be further changed - by coupling with an even less effi-ciently-coupled mode of electroneurobiological operation over considerable regions of the brain tissue - into a new velocity that only subtracts a 10-96 fraction from light speed and so turns the observer's acuity into a time resolution unable to resolve less than doz-ens of minutes. It is a much coarser time-resolution or time-acuity (sometimes called "time-graining") than the one with which the formations offered by the brain organ keep track of the transformations of surrounding relevancies to "read" the environment in a biologically useful "tempo."
By analogy, such a condition resembles playing a musical recording at a speed many thousand times slower than the proper rate - stretching any musicality beyond recogni-tion, forfeiting any ability to resolve (identify) single sounds or recognize the musical per-formance. However, the observer's "local" acuity stays unaltered and, whenever such an observer is awakened from any sleep stage (whether dreaming or not), she breaks off some course of mentation, that "at the precise time" was entertaining. Between the two subtracted values, respectively appropriate to deep sleep and to wakefulness, a full range of attention-disattention is established, and each degree set in it may affect all or instead some of the brain's sensable productions.
Can brain changes erase episodic and praxical memories, regardless of their time "graining" or patterning interval units? No, because no brain engraving of them exists. Just as impetus is superfluous in keeping unperturbed bodies in rectilinear motion, en-graving such memories in the brain is superfluous in keeping them in mind. Since nature is actual only one physical instant at a time, only the changed realities are actual in na-ture and the very antecedent making of all extramental changes is completely lost ex-tramentally: that is, the past no longer exists. This follows from the discreteness of physically efficient changes (Planck's observation) and from their setting time on macro-scopic scales. Thus, from the above definition of psyches, it follows that the changes in-side their minds (i. e., sensoperceptions as well as episodic and praxical memories) lack a further, causally efficient multi-instant course structure that could make its former states vanish: it cannot occur inside the single-instant actuality of the mind's changes causal-efficiently achieved. Thus they "remain" available and make the three sorts of acquired availabilities.
Closer to an adage, our tradition states that memories cannot succumb to time: the si-multaneous availability of the full autobiographical sequence is to be expected in the sheer availing self-knowledge of one's ontic reality. Circumstanced existentialities are not limited to occupying processes in sequential time, such as operating machines are - although the biological function of mind-differentiating psyches is concerned with those processes, which are located solely beyond psyches. In still other words, every thing that knows of itself (psyche) cannot lose its sequences of changes as inner differentia-tions of its ontic consistency (which thus become "acquired availabilities"), because psy-ches do not exist in more than one instant and their causal efficiency does not establish (by way of action discreteness, exhausting efficient action in its doing causal change) another time inside them. Observers' ontology can become differentiated into containing calendars, but not into containing causally real intervals.
Psyches, experiencers, or existentialities, and consequently also their inner differentia-tions or minds, exist only as present, in the same way as on time-transformation courses the whole nature exists a single physical instant at a time (singuli): thus extramentalities neither keep time-transformation courses in their present actuality, nor do psyches keep time-transformation courses inside the single present in which their ontology gnose-ologically apprehends themselves. For this reason a psyche's diversifications - her mind, or ontic differentiations or mental contents, which introduce inner variety in her re-ality - as acquired availabilities can be variably paid heed by her own semovient-gnoseological reality, but cannot be obliterated by action of extramental means. Another extramental time would be intramentally needed in order to achieve it, so that time could "perish in time and the now in other now," to draw on the sixth century wording of Dam-ascius.
In such circumstances, just as Newton's formulation of the laws of motion in Euclidean nature builds on his recognition that the "natural" motion or prosecution of unperturbed movements is rectilinear, so that a body left to its state of translative motion continues moving in a straight line rather than slowing down and coming to a halt or pursuing a curved or circular path, our tradition builds on a similar recognition. We take into account that the natural fate of the differentiations (memories), in those realities that know them-selves while existing inside what outside is named the instant, is the conservation of all of these differentiations - rather than these memories becoming "erased," namely, pur-suing any oblivion process path as affected by a time elapsing ("time") that occurs where they do not exist. (As mentioned, this is so because the observer's differentia-tions exist outside the course of transformations in three-dimensional space, a course whose possibility and installation in the relevant scale of such space depends, in turn, on certain early cosmological events, namely the acquisition of inertial mass by certain species of "particles" but not all of them.) There is no time within time. It is the "inside in-stant" feature of such ontic-gnoseological realities, the observers' minds, that turns su-perfluous all extramental engraving or script like recording of memories, just as impetus is also superfluous in keeping unperturbed bodies in rectilinear motion.
The "inside instant" existence of sentient agencies also thrusts itself into attention as the foremost characteristic of the subjective phenomenology of time. This characteristic is that time does not elapse for the experiencer - el alma nunca pierde su lozanía, i. e. the fact observable at any age that one's existentiality never loses her freshness - whereas time does manifestly elapse, instead, for one's novel experiences, whose presentation is inescapably sequential, as well as for the perceivable extramental things, such as one's aging body. Remarkably, though, such a conspicuous phenomenological trait of existen-tialities remains neglected by phenomenologists and by all the researchers that take the mental contents for psyches. The neglect might nevertheless have been instigated by culture, for example by the bracketing of diachronies in the yearning for a "block" uni-verse, or by making it difficult in old age to distinguish between the deterioration of some kinds of performance and the integrity of one's unacquired or primary constituents; to stress the latter is as unusual as it would be trite to remark that outer behavior, imagina-tion, and reimagination are affected by brain pathology. On the other hand, although memories cannot be erased because of not being retained in time transformability, they may, however, just fail to be understood in terms of some operative scheme of semovi-ent operations - and thus fail to be reimagined by inchoatively re-enacting such schemes, even while the brain organ works flawlessly. This makes for an important va-riety of oblivion, of psychogenic nature. Its basis is related to the very means whereby first disattention, then sleep, and then other "losses of consciousness" disconnect minds more and more from their surroundings.
By What Means do Sleep, Fainting, Comas, and Similar States Disconnect Minds from their Surroundings? By now it should be clear that psyches act in nature: all action in na-ture comes in packets, the packets of some species have a certain inertial mass that turns their speed slower than c, their coupling with the variable intensities of a surround-ing field makes effective certain speed changes - tenuously similar to what a variably refractive medium does to the effective value of light's speed - and, so, psyches or exis-tentialities localizing on them their interactions obtain a peculiar time-condensed view of the events in which they causally participate. As a brain reduces its braking on those causal carriers where the action of the psyche that senses and acts through such a brain inserts itself in extramentalities, the braking reduction speeds up the traveling lo-calization (namely, such carriers) of the psyche's exchanges with extramentality. Pursu-ing the optical analogy, one might imagine a reduction in the medium's refractive index. If of sufficient intensity, this reduction, shifting from one system of constraints to another the force carriers that provide a psyche's immediate circumstance, puts to sleep the ex-istentiality circumstanced at this brain: in the new state of motion, she will no longer be able to resolve the brain's surroundings-depicting activity. The brain itself, of course, does not stop its electroneurobiological depictional activity during sleep, but this physio-logical activity (all of it carried out in the electromagnetic modality of interaction, that is, by exchanging force carriers of the species called photons) is not directly knowable by changes in the mind of the psyche circumstanced therein. Or, in other words, this proc-ess "switches off" the awareness of the body, by putting the sequences of brain activi-ties out of resolutive reach of the circumstanced psyche. Her actions, too, become mis-matched with brain-mediated behavioral articulations, a matter discussed below.
The "switching off" may come to the sequences of the activities of some brain portion, since sleep may not affect at once an entire brain but only half of it, or a sizable region, as occurs in many reptiles, almost all birds, and a number of mammals. This is why hu-man snorers, who do sleep with the entire brain, cannot hear themselves snore - though a mother might re-attune the time-resolution of her sensory input, or "awaken," at her baby's slight uneasiness, because of neural reactions (probably involving limbic ac-tivation of the startle response) that stir a re-increase in the field-mediated braking. The same means is at play whenever electroneurodynamic activities become impaired and fail to provide alert time-acuity, failing ("loss of consciousness," fainting spell) to keep time-acuity sufficiently fine-grained as to resolve their imitative outlining of the biologi-cally relevant sequences of events.
For what reason are dreamt sensations perceived while simultaneous sensations com-ing from the sense organs are not perceived? The converse, namely psyche's causal action in extramentality, thus also occurs across different relativistic reference frames ("is also transframed"). As mentioned, the healthy brain is always "on" and sensory neu-roactivity does not cease with sleep. This fact is routinely verified in laboratories and also in the very remarkable, revealing convenience of closing eyelids to sleep, even of tucking the head beneath a wing to nap - as birds do. It is a key fact. This convenience would not arise if neuroactivity would stop, or if, as certain accounts put it, some "cur-tain" firing of thalamic and cortical cells occluded the transmission of sensory informa-tion through the thalamus and cortex, sustaining sleep by innerly clogging up the inflow of sense data: that is, by already doing the job of a sort of "neurodynamic palpebra" or "intracerebral eyelids." Nor, in those scenarios, would inattention be a step toward sleep - as it is.
Routine verification of such key facts exposes an acute contradiction in the neuroscien-tific opinions purporting to localize mental occurrences at the physiology that takes place in the tissue's reference frame. A dream-originated fa music note is sensed, but the same dreamer does not sense a fa note from the external world enacted in the same brain.
A deathblow to single motion-frame "neurophilosophies," this crucial fact simply comes from the both-ways nature of relativistic transframing. Dreamers are usually asleep. The minds of these dreaming psyches, which during deep sleep interact with extramentality from additionally accelerated force carriers (less slowed ones, whose motion may only subtract up to a scant 10 96 fraction from light speed), put the brain in electroneurobi-ological states (to which the psyche or existentiality then reacts by intonating herself with oneiric sensations) through a slower, yet not very much slower, time resolution. From the mentioned range of dilations, which on the above assumptions correspond to subtracted fractions between 10 82 and 10 96 of light speed, the time dilations during dreaming are those that barely suffice to leave unresolved the sensory sequences, de-livered for awake acuity. Such small yet sufficient excursions away from awake acuity are implied by the dreaming control of neural tissue and also by the not inordinate time that every dream takes; whence one might predict that, when the duration of dreamt module performances such as a walking step could be accurately compared with extra-mental time, it would show only a moderate stretching. The moderateness of such ex-cursions is also implied by the oneiric interpretation of environmental occurrences, such as alarm activation or thingamabobs found in the bed.
The dreaming dilations thus constitute a deep inattention that does not result from the greater dilations, or larger deceleration loosenings, proper of "nondreaming" or "deep" sleep: in fact, when these dilations do not confine a dreamt episode to reasonable clock time, it is said that the sleeper "does not dream." In turn, during dreaming the sense or-gans are putting the brain into electroneurobiological states that could be resolved if the existentiality or psyche had been circumstanced to carriers whose motion subtracted from light speed a far greater fraction, namely 10 82 - but which the dreaming psyche cannot time-resolve so as to react at those states intonatively. Instead the psyche's own causal action, transferred via those faster-moving sources, is transframed with the reso-lution proper to generate superposed brain states (states for the two fa notes are in the same brain region) to which the existentiality circumstanced to faster-moving force car-riers reacts, as mentioned, intonating herself with the oneiric sensations. She operates, so to speak, her own domain of contiguous phosphenes with the extramental time reso-lution that she is currently availing herself of. Thus we do not sense the extramental oc-currences while dreaming because the sensory input stays in a transiently unresolvable motion reference frame, which does not prevent psyches from using the same brain re-gions in order to generate dreamt sensations.
How do Perceived Features Fade due to Inattention? As the crucial observation of monohemispheric sleep (Mukhametov 1984) shows, the reduction, in the braking that the brain imparts to the causal carriers through which psyche's action inserts itself in ex-tramentalities, is regional. Brakening loosens and these force carriers gain speed in some brain regions, not necessarily in all of them. In other words, although the process can be extended to the entirety of the brain's gray, basically it is in certain brain regions that the force carriers providing a psyche or existentiality's immediate circumstance move from one system of constraints to another. Things occur as if less dynamical elec-tric states (i.e., simpler courses of the potential's variations) of the brain tissue, associ-ated in mammals - but not in reptiles - with sleep and distraction, took less dynamical mass from the force carriers traversing through them, which to traverse every millimeter (refringency assumed) take some 1032 Planck instants. Because this short period amply accommodates the characteristic time of electromagnetic interactions, the carriers can be regionally "freed" from braking, namely gradually allowed to reduce the fraction of their dynamical mass claimed by the dynamic state of the coupling electric field that they go across in such regions. So, before exiting the brain and being replaced by others (just as the molecular components of metabolism do, if in a much more leisurely way and far circuitously), these carriers speed up - gradually losing the circumstanced psy-che's resolution as regards the sensory formations built in these particular brain regions.
In this way, before the new speed becomes so fast that it completely blocks the resolu-tion of sensory notices (as occurs during sleep), the regional sensory output fades "into inattention" around other features kept in one's attentional focus, without loss of its availability for semoviently-steerable attention. In other words this fading sensory "com-plement," which surrounds what one is attending to, loses affective prominence or force of imposition (Zubiri's noergy) because of the slight speeding up of the mentioned carri-ers in the brain areas that generate the voluntarily neglected sensory features. This me-chanical "reddening" (more on this designation in a moment) is why inattention is a step toward sleep, another crucial observation. It is probably linked with ketamine's mimick-ing schizophrenias as a step toward its acting as an anesthetic; anesthetics as well as oneirogens, substances that increase dreaming time such as those in the leaves of Sal-via divinorum, must act by way of altering the field-coupled neurodynamics. This me-chanical "reddening" also prevents recalling the experiences lived under it, another topic discussed soon. Focusing attention thus consists in selecting ("esemplastically," a term that denotes the action featured, e. g., in selecting one or rather another finger to move), in some regions of brain volume, a limited sector of brain states that continue inducing optimal braking to the causal-action carriers where one is circumstanced to.
Thus the selected sector of brain productions is "put in the focus of attention," namely these brain productions impose themselves in full noergy: they cause, in the existential-ity or psyche's ontology, intonative reactions that blossom in full affective prominence, operative interpretation and sensory intensity. One might say that they take full root in the mind, or fully radicate in it. At the same time, conversely, their encasing sensory complement is perceived with weaker force of imposition or fainter affective prominence (less noergy, a process that at times is labeled absent-mindedness, and considering its productive mechanism would be dubbed "reddening" if speaking of extramental actions rather than of intramental reactions). Such attenuated noergy or lesser radication pre-vents the progress of its detailed operative interpretation yet without loss of all its sen-sory intensity and availability. This occurs because the modulus of time acuity of the un-attended complement differs from that of the far-previously memorized operations through which one can recognize its contents. In the limit, as a result of this process, consciousness is neither a part of every sensation nor is every sensation necessarily conscious, though it always is a mental differentiation and so is gnoseologically appre-hended.
Attenuated noergy differs from the habituative blurring of the experiences had in the very focus of attention, whereby e. g. one cannot easily distinguish (because of reitera-tion and not of inattentiveness, as discussed below) between the memories of the greet-ings had when one came back home, as habitual in the night, a hundred days ago, and ninety nine days ago. Yet these memories exist, because their blurring is remediable (and one might extricate the reimagining attempt from the predicament) if simply one also finds attended-to marks to tell between both events. Likewise if shown a photo a busy salesclerk may recall things otherwise unrememberable about the unique visit to the shop made days ago by a particular customer. In contrast, the unavailability of a lec-ture's short section, finished a minute ago but "unheard" while enthralled by another pursuit, is irremediable. Let me outline this particular point.
Noergy is not an action whose energy might be measured or transformed in a manner observable by the public (or psyches other than the incumbent), released by the braken-ing of noematic carriers. Noergy is, instead, a reaction whose effects re-texture the ontic consistency of the circumstanced psyche, wherein by lack of time course her past stays unerasable, that is, causally efficient for gnoseological grasp. But no dimensional mirror-ing of actions with reactions is conserved across the brain-mind interface. This is why one could only arrive at, eventually, assess noergy in other minds in terms of transfram-ing's departure from the focal attention value (zero departure makes a 100 percent no-ergy), comparing force of imposition but losing its intonative dimensions. Where no psy-ches are circunstanced, actions and reactions characterize each another with features from the same set. But in a nature that includes circumstanced existentialities, intona-tions are found to result from extramental actions that are depicted with a certain set of features, whereas those actions generate reactions depicted with another set of fea-tures.
This symmetry breaking is a very fundamental datum, of the natural science that strives to describe a nature where psyches are encountered. Force in nature appears diversi-fied or segregated fivefold: we observe four "basic forces" or modalities of causal inter-action - by name the strong nuclear force, the weak nuclear force, the electromagnetic force, and the gravitational force - in its actions outside us, and a further segregated modality of causal interaction or "basic force," namely the one whose action carriers un-dergo the speed variations that tune the circumstanced psyche's time acuity, likewise from its actions outside of us (e. g. its effects in biological evolution), but moreover from our reactions to the variations of its states. These reactions are the existentiality or psy-che's subjective intonations, or sensational phenomena.
The identification of this additional segregated physical force in our neurobiological tradi-tion (whose earlier consideration of it had been misconstrued abroad as vitalism) as the modality of causal interaction in which the dimensional mirroring of actions with reac-tions is not conserved across the brain-mind interface, arose in the frame of compara-tive research completed here between 1964 and 1971 (Crocco 1963, 1971: see Source List). However, this general force does not enact its mental effects in an experiential void. Each circumstanced psyche is ontically textured by the sedimentation of her bio-graphical experiences ("rememberings") and undergoes a re-texturing because of her noergic reactions to local variations of this extramental force ("sensations"). This re-texturing can be properly rendered in terms of her previously sedimented semovient op-erations ("perceptions") only if the time-acuities of both match.
In this process it plays a part the developmentally-built set of semovient actions that an existentiality recognizes in herself as available for applying onto certain sensed content once neuroactivity delivered it to sentience, as non-structural sensations and their struc-tural patterns; for example, as a certain array of phosphenes. This particular set of the psyche's possible actions is the subset that gathers those of her operations that "con-serve" (i. e. keep identifiable) the phosphenes' sensational patterns across operative re-equilibrations, e. g., combining mental operations themselves plus their reverse execu-tions. This makes it possible to "recognize" the sensations and their patterns in the op-erational terms that render them perceptions. They no longer just display meaningless phosphenes. What in all this does matter to noergy is that the full articulation of those sedimented operations cannot be applied onto poorly time-resolvable or time-unresolvable sensations. In this case, their texture inserts itself feebly into what the exis-tentiality or psyche knows as semoviently doable. Noergy's other names, "force of impo-sition" or "affective prominence," refer to this imposition of each sensory or (reimagined) mnesic mental content onto the equilibrable structures of semovient operations in which the psyche's ontic-ontological consistency has become constituted with development, that is, since a long time ago. ("Affective," in "affective prominence," does not point to sentimental affairs. It refers to the affecting of the equilibrable structures of semovient operations by each sensory or reimagined content, namely the degree of detail in which it admits the application of the mind's constitutive structure of semovient operations.) Throughout the successive stages of the growth, the mental operations attain a particu-lar structure, called intelligence, whose specialized or "factorial" articulations establish how one "sees" the surroundings and oneself in them.
These acquired structures of operations, coming from way back in life, were of course originally acquired with the intrinsic time graining of the attentional focus. So their execu-tion, even incipient, requires an additional operation - which would create a new esem-plastic reclustering, regrouping elements into new accidental units - to be matched with the time acuity of the contents of the unattended, encasing sensory complement so as to interpret its contents in operational terms.
If these unattended contents are not put into the focus of attention, by way of this esem-plastic reclustering, in operational terms they remain interpreted in low detail, outside of the organizational scheme being considered; that is to say, "folded up" in the vein of the complicated combinations of logic-mathematical operations substituted in mental treat-ment by a simple indicator (or by a single sign in writing). This condition of abreviated scheme is called "unattended." The name means that, operationally, the sensations are undetailedly sorted out: just sketchily categorized.
This links up sensory time resolution with mnesic operational resolution. Attention grants full objecthood because, for categorizing its sensory content, the combinable operations sedimented in the sensing existentiality are not blurred either by fusion (as occurs when these operations' time structure results too tight to become resolved in the frame that presents the sensory content) or by scattering over time (as occurs when these opera-tions' time structure results too lax to be encompassed as a group in the frame that pre-sents the sensory content). This is also why the attentional reclustering, as it re-structures into new figure-background terms the focal "field of attention," often disrupts other operations that might being made.
Yet before a voluntary refocusing of attention allows recognizing unattended occur-rences, a mechanical arrangement or "machinamentum" sets up the scene, and then becomes intentionally implemented. Unheeded sequences, that is, a song to which little or no attention is given while reading, become impositively fainter (affectively less prominent) rather than slower because their pattern is embodied by modulations of cycle warpings, or hysteresis losses, in the brain's electric field oscillations whose cycles be-come partly included in the mind's modulus of acuity.
Basically, shifting attention slows a number of the noematic carriers that form the imme-diate circumstance of the psyche that, along her intellectual development, innerly differ-entiated itself into such a mind or set of mental contents. Shifting attention slows the particular "volley" or cast of action carriers whose states thereby generate, in this psy-che or existentiality, intonative reactions with full noergy ("in the focus of attention"), by increasing their coupling to the brain electric field. In more familiar terms, every volun-tary shift of attention generates a new local or regional dynamism of the brain electric field, which allows the next cast, of those action carriers that form a psyche's immediate circumstance, to "affix" or "absorb" more of their dynamical mass into the coupled, elec-tromagnetic field (whose action they do not carry); involuntary, physiologically originated shifts of attention proceed in reverse, starting at the electromagnetic field's state rather than at those other force carriers that form the existentiality's immediate circumstance. This "absorptive redistribution" keeps those carriers' inertial mass (and their absolute dynamical mass) unchanged, but decreases their speed. This occurs, for example, in regional hysteresis losses when a voluntarily shifted, regional change - which might compose the electroencephalographic pattern - increases or decreases the causal modifications ("inflections") of this field's dynamic, while proceeding conversely (respec-tively, decreasing or increasing them) for its occasional "neglected" background. What matters is the course of the coupled inflections, not the electroencephalographic syn-chronization or desynchronization itself: as commented, reptiles and mammals keep paying attention on opposite electroencephalographic regimes; moreover, electroen-cephalographic activity includes a great deal of potential variations concomitant but un-related to the mind's actions and reactions; see, e. g., De Vera et al. (2005). Thus, whether stirred by the circumstanced psyche (voluntary attentional shift) or by her brain's physiology (involuntary attentional shift), the brain's resulting regular action upon its circumstanced psyche enacts, in her, intonated reactions with variable noergy, that is, more or less interpretable in operational terms.
By a single causal means, the psyche's semovient action on the brain tissue in turn en-acts
(1) displacements of the focus of attention (described here as "esemplastic reclus-tering" or shiftings of the accidental unity attentionally conferred on some objects, whether over one's mind extant ontology - for example, searching for a memory before recalling it, the existentiality or psyche being active in one respect and passive in an-other - or over the sensible presentations currently offered by the brain, as while read-ing these lines a good deal of the surrounding events becomes sidelined by weakening their phenomenicity's impositive force);
(2) bodily motions, for instance, moving a finger rather than another (in which what is shifted is the electroneurobiological state modulating the neuronal activity that gener-ates the finger's displacement) or opposing resistance to sleep (in which what is shifted is the electroneurobiological state modulating the neuronal activity which generates the electroneurobiological state that slackens time acuity); and
(3) the psyche-facing, feature-determining brain states generated by the existential-ity or psyche herself, to which she reacts with dreamt sensations while escaping from sensationally reacting to the feature-determining brain states established by the sense organs.
How are Voluntary Movements Attentionally Determined? Likewise, the attentional se-lection of a particular portion of the mind's corporal scheme for moving the related body part - say, a certain finger - puts in the background the mental images of other bodily parts. Namely, of those parts that are not to be voluntarily moved, or moved differently, as in juggling. This makes the psyche's causal action effective only for those segments of brain architecture - in fact, non-static ones and varying with practice - that, through acuity-matching electroneurodynamics and the causally-related biochemical processes spatially arranged within it, trigger outward the willed movement.
This intentional process generates a voluntary modulation of neocortical electric dynam-ics accomplished in everyday behavior, such as in waving a hand. Bypassing the hand, the resulting neurodynamic modulation, or its metabolic/hemodynamic concomitants, makes it possible to communicate or activate external devices without muscle activity, using electric brain signals - nothing more "mind reading" or thought transducing than reading the results of any other willful communication or activity, such as properly "wav-ing" the hand on a keyboard, or talking into a telephone or into the air in front of a face-to-face interlocutor. So, for example, the voluntary modulation of neocortical electrical dynamics is also used to gain control over a motor imagery-based system in the cou-pling of electroencephalogram-based brain-computer interfaces with a neuroprosthesis. The neuroprosthesis is thus operated by voluntary generation of distinctive EEG pat-terns, which usually are power decreases in specific frequency bands, at imagining con-secutive movements of a paralyzed limb, so that the patient is able to move a simple ob-ject from one real place to another, or navigating in a virtual environment; see e.g. Mul-ler-Putz et al. 2005; Leeb et al. 2005, and Kubler et al. 2005. Several types of brain sig-nals have been explored for this use, among them slow cortical potentials, cortical neu-ronal activity, and beta and mu rhythms (cf. Santana et al., 2004; Yamawaki, 2005), whether through systems fully implanted in the brain or still invasive microminiaturized "neuroports" (Patterson et al. 2004), or noninvasively (Wolpaw and McFarland 2004, Hinterberger et al., 2004; cf. Yoo et al., 2004) such as in EEG-biofeedback. The latter, also called neurofeedback, is a rather trivial training technique - frequently accompa-nied by commercial or superstitious claims, too - designed to teach people, by trial and error, how to increase specific frequency bands of their brain waves upon receiving real-time feedback of their scalp-recorded electroencephalographic rhythms; cf. Egner et al., 2004; Weiskopf et al. 2004; Weiler et al. 2002; Congedo, Lubar, and Joffe, 2004. All these examples point that shifting attention is a part of every voluntary modulation of neocortical electric dynamics, independently of the causal chains appended afterwards, such as vocalization, writing, manipulation of external devices, or any other motor ac-tion.
Specifically, it makes the psyche's causal action effective only for those brain segments that have developmentally turned up as such, themselves not thought about - because no brain segments are intended, but their action's outer result - but operatively identified by the individual only in terms of this connection. We might note in passing that the vol-untary reimagining of a certain memory does not greatly differ from the voluntary waving of a certain finger. Rather than using the anatomical connection to a particular body part, the segments of brain architecture enact the electroneurodynamic states that put the psyche's immediate extramentality in the state that makes her nomically react by such reimagining. More on this below.
Once they have been recalled and given attention to, where do memories again fade into? Mnesic localization, aimed to find an episodic memory already known as available ("known as known," although not yet remembered), is carried out in the current inatten-tion domain. This inattention or inoperativeness domain is also where memories recede, or are "re-forgotten," when no longer imagined. This is an inattention in which they are "folded up" as abreviated operational schemes. This means that do not stir, in any de-gree of detail, the application of the equilibrable structure of semovient causal opera-tions that constitutes them. In their inattention domain, the only operative articulations available are the attention-focusing operations that navigate the biographical sedimenta-tion through its larger posts. These navigating attention-focusing operations are external to the operations that imaginatively unfold the remembering's individual units; the former merely specify the latter in biographical context.
From this inattention domain every memory arises, when it is reimagined after so having been "localized" (rather, operationally specified) in the operational availabilities of the observer's biographical sedimentation. There, experienced reactions cannot elapse be-cause the observer's ontic reality lacks a causally efficient multi-instant course consis-tency, which could vanish its former states inside the psyche's single-instant actuality that, with causal efficiency, is achieving inner and outer changes. But her memory is far from being any laying down of archival data, or sedimentation of news that in future times is to be merely contemplated, "unoperatively." Memory is the sedimentation of nonsensorial habits of motor schemes whose sensorily intonated reimagination, though it allows believing that certain features stay in it awaiting discovery by exploration of the completed mental image, in fact receives these features when one adds them to the re-imagination with the mere act of thinking them, one after another.
Thus this operational specification ("localization") among other availabilities ("visio gen-eralis") is not intrinsically different from that of the proper fingers when, having crossed (say) the second under the fourth finger of a hand, one is summoned to move a certain one of both fingers, without looking at them. This kind of mentally led extrication, in-stead, becomes ineffective when a patient with small areas of brain damage, despite great efforts, could neither name nor describe the function of a glass of water that he, a little later, reaches for and from which he takes a drink - by using undamaged brain por-tions whose performance is not coupled with the attentional focus. One's corporal scheme includes the sedimentation in one's ontic consistency of one's causal involve-ments, which are to find their respective neuroactivity to produce their reimagination just as, using the bodily scheme, one is to find the respective neuroactivity to produce the proper action.
The conditions of this neuroactivity are, organically, quite specific (e. g., activity of the CA3 region of the hippocampus is key for recalling our memories from fragmentary rep-resentations) and it may easily become inadequate because of factors extraneous to the attentional selection, such as finger "braiding" or cerebral dysfunction. Thus, recalling one's memories and moving one's limbs employ an attentional reclustering of one's sedimented operations in order to put such particular availabilities into conditions of re-enactment - that involve reattending to them, i. e. their proper time resolution.
How does Inattention cause Amnesia? The same specific mechanism also prevents re-membering most sleep mentation after awakening; dissociates the handiness of awake rememberings from oneiric threads (and of oneiric episodes from awake decisions); puts distractions before forgetting in the beginning of dementedness processes; turns status epilepticus with more of a propensity to anterograde than to retrograde amnesia; and, in traumatic memory deficits, makes the recall of the pretraumatic (retrograde) portion of life, forgotten in a mnesic lacuna or memory "lagoon," depend on the same lacuna's posttraumatic (anterograde) portion or "amnesia of fixation" period.
In all these cases, the biographical episodes lived from a certain time dilation (say, dreamt; or perceived through a sane brain tissue long before a dementia's initial stages; or lived and memorized before the brain tissue became concussed and later recovered leaving a posttraumatic "amnesia of fixation," to consider three examples) can no longer be operatively categorized when the relativistic speed state, of the biophysical compo-nents that form their experiencer's immediate circumstance, changes into another rela-tivistic speed state (respectively for those three examples: (1) in awake life; (2) sensed through a deteriorating brain tissue, in a dementia's initial stages; and (3) recalled through a reimagining context that should have included the episodes forgotten by "am-nesia of fixation").
During the attempted recall, when the relativistic speed state of the psyche's immediate circumstance differs from either the speed state through which the episode was lived or from the speed state through which temporally neighboring episodes were lived that should have been included to reimagine the context by drawing closer - backward in memories' sequence - to the sought episode, the difference hampers the arrangement, by voluntary recall, of the brain physiology so as to generate phenomena that might be recognized, in operational categories, as the aimed-at memory. On this attempt act the physiological abnormalities that head blows bring about.
For a time after the encephalic concussion, the brain does not tune its electroneurobiol-ogy so as to furnish proper time dilation to sensory experiences. So these experiences lose impositive force, or noergy. It results in a condition similar to that involved in the fading, into "distraction," of many memories of the habitual life lived in the months or years after bereavement. Thus at their occurrence one perceives the sensory experi-ences just as one perceives scarcely attended-to vehicle and foot traffic around the bus in which one travels. These scarcely attended-to vehicles and footers are well seen, heard and identified in some incipient detail but soon, even perhaps before one goes out of the bus, one cannot put their perceptions in any order so as to recall their presenta-tion. The same occurs to all the life episodes in some (often transient) postconcussive stages.
Such a process is called "distraction" when it intrudes on one´s plans, as when, while reading, one plays a music disc with many songs and sometimes find that the themes that one most wanted to hear are finishing, have been "heard," yet their memory - though recent - is irretrievable. To stir the affects and emotions one wished to draw from the audition (in this case more obviously called "affective prominence," though al-ways stirred after operational categorization) they should be played anew - and listened without reading. Preventing it is why, illustratively, theaters impose silence and darken the seating precisely when performances commence.
As it should now be plain, this "distraction" is what in clinical contexts is called "fixation amnesia" or anterograde amnesia, namely difficulties in learning new informations. In the beginning of dementias it precedes the older memories' unreimaginability (forget-ting), and the same mechanism also conditions the possibilities of awake and dreaming states for reciprocal recall. In sleep mentation it also brings about the "attentional nar-rowing," the thematic or experiential reduction that impoverishes one's full experience, shrinkening the menu of other experiences that one keeps available to be collated with the actual contents of an oneiric thread in such a way that - above and beyond more specific cognitional effects - while dreaming we are habitually unaware that we are in fact in a dreamworld. On the same basis, it also sets the distribution, over the sleep pe-riod, of the dreams that include "diurnal rests."
Noergy disparities reflect not absolute but proportional disparities in resolution, as shown by the common observation that the experiences that closely precede powerful emotions, although acquired with unweakened noergy, are as likely to be forgotten as those of the enthralling emotional event's experiential margin, which, instead, faded into "distraction" at acquisition time. They cause people awakened after having slept more than a very short while to typically be unable to recall the last few minutes before they fell asleep, and also make people prone to forgetting phone calls or exchanges they have had in the middle of the night, or the alarm's ringing in the morning if one went right back to sleep after turning it off. Acquisition with decreased noergy is too why, of the memories "diluted" by anterograde amnesia, no recovery is observed similar to the gradual reinstatement of pretrauma memories common with retrograde amnesia.
When is Neuroactivity Non-Conscious? By way of establishing mental contents, seg-ments of neurodynamics became linked - through, therefore, a psyche or existentiality functionally positioned in a superior level of organic regulation, which addresses molarly its objects and lets in semovience and tunable motivation - with the novelties from the environment and other neuroactivities. At the same time, other segments of neuroactiv-ity remain just substratally connected, processed through microphysical causality. In fact they evolved quite apart and upon parallel processes of natural selection, a topic not studied in this article.
Brain-mind relationships display a fundamental form of locality, which sets a foregoing bearing on which neuroactivity might be experienced: while the electromagnetic field is continuous all over nature (spatially, every physical field replet orbem terrarum, or in modern terms it fills the whole universe), not all minds react to a brain's electrodynamic patterns (even when these patterns become to structure the nonstructural, intonative re-actions of some existentiality's experience). Only does so the mind or set of mental con-tents in which has become innerly diferentiated the particular psyche whose extramental immediacy is locally coupled to those electromagnetic patterns, on a determination more substantial and basic than these physical exchanges. For every psychism, therefore, all foreign neuroactivity is forever nonconscious.
Yet, even for this particular psyche, not all of the "local" neuroactivity specifies new men-tal contents. Through reduction in the reactions' force of imposition, a variable amount of local neuroactivities is for her as much unconscious as it is for all the minds circum-stanced to different drifting localities (or parcels) of the same field. This nonconscious condition is also to affect neuroactivity by way of unsuitable transframings. Excessive "neglect", preventing to demarcate mental contents, is to happen when, in loosening up the brakening electrodynamically forced onto the causal carriers which a psyche reacts to and where the psyche's action inserts itself in extramentalities (by loosening the elec-tromagnetic field absorption of their dynamical mass), the patterns that neuroactivity might form (in the mentioned hysteresis losses of the brain electroactivity coupled to the causal carriers) turn up transframed with a time dilation that so much weakens the force of imposition, of the intonative reactions to these patterns in the existentiality's ontic consistency, that those intonative reactions merely compound in the sensational back-ground noise of this existentiality.
Neuroactivity nonconscious by noergy unproductiveness may include many physiologi-cal processes. Some of these, coming chiefly from genetic determinations, participate in the determination of "instinctive behaviors" such as prey capture, nesting, flying, and in-volved courtships that in many species may go on without psychism. Others, in empsy-ched animals, come from the inner needs of ongoing courses of action (such as the loss into inattention underwent by the routine details of learned abilities, or by equilibration in "instinctive" flying or walking) and from current stimuli ("tacit" processing).
Cerebral architectures may optimize the addition, onto some regional function, of its gnoseological apprehension with adaptive time acuity - or either, moving on a workable physical range, may leave such cerebral operation uncharted in mental differentiations, namely unsuspected by the psyche that senses and controls other activities of the same brain: unbeknownst to the circumstanced existentiality. The time dilation that when spread over the whole tissue knocks out noergy to all of the brain's possible productions is that of deep sleep. It is a ligamentum sensus which nevertheless leaves for mentation all of the psyche's availabilities and her memories in the visio generalis - so one can explore them and, when in some brain areas the time dilation comes closer to that of the awake state, such exploration cannot help but reimagine them with aspects not very re-moved from the ones which the episodes presented in awake life. In the middle of this workable range, diverse levels of inattention are available to apply onto the mental products of such cerebral operation.
In this way, that is, spatially diversified as regard the transframing-inflicted time resolu-tion of its patterns, a great and variable deal of neuroactivity is often nonconscious: it remains "unconscious" and, so, foreign to any existentiality, not specifying new mental contents. Many electrodynamic leakages from the functioning of intracerebral ganglia stay unrelated to the generation of mental reactions. Other segments of neural process-ing induce low-noergy, unattended sensoperceptions. A case in point, the control of low-frequency cortical electrical activity by respiratory activity in a lizard, has been worked out by De Vera et al. (2005 and previous research work; cf. references therein); the evi-dence is not at hand to enable determining whether or not reactions to this induced ac-tivity are present to the experience of the incumbent existentiality. Still other segments of neuroactivity induce, in the focus of attention, sensoperceptions whether semoviently fancied or, instead, continuing environmental causality (namely, sensorially acquired sensoperceptions).
How are Memories Semoviently Recalled and Recognized as One's Own? Situating in autobiographical context one's memory of an episode, whose reconstruction is being voluntarily "recalled," means semoviently arriving to focuse attention on the same possi-bility, of combining equilibrable operations, which one had when the episode occurred. As Aristotle (-384 to -322) described it in Perì Mnéemees kaì Anamnéeseoos ("On Memory and Reminiscence") 451b30, "When one wills calling to mind, what one should do is this: one will try to obtain an initiation of motion whose follow-up be the movement that he wishes to experience again."
One's conception of the results of such actions is the entirety of our concept of the ob-ject, which even if unrepeatable as a unique biographical episode is to be replicated in imagination, any number of times, just as defined by one's operatory possibilities that make its elements recognizable or understandable for oneself. Hitherto my discussion of what is known in nature considered intonations, which are mind reactions, and now I should put an important addition in. Also semovience is perspicuous: the will provides its own certainty. This is what allows to mnesically sediment the patterns of our semovient actions.
The motor effort is grasped through an inner immediate apperception: one's causal act unfolds itself on gnoseologically apprehended dimensions constitutive of its agent, that is, of oneself. In our tradition's view, this postdecisional apperception is that of a reac-tion, which is unintonated or non-phenomenal (some also label it "nonsensory") as the enactment exhausts itself in the extramental act. When the causal efficiency of the se-movient action causes a modification in the hylozoic hiatus, it directly enacts a real modification of the immediate circumstances but not of the mind. We do not feel it. What thus we grasp is our having closed a situation open-ended at its conditions. We react to our doing, not to its outside-exhausted causal efficiency. The subjective evidence that semovience is perspicuous includes, among the multifarious actions that one originates, the production of our inner voice. In addition to subjective evidence, we objectively ob-serve that semovience is perspicuous in two situations. First, the knowledge that ani-mals developmentally gain become adequate to deal with extramentalities (and thus the acquisition of this knowledge was evolutionarily selected) and to successfully handle ex-tramental causation, though this latter eludes observers forever. Second, as François P.-G. Maine de Biran first observed, within the knowledges that psyches or existential-ities gain a quite exact line demarcates what there is of passive and of active: habitual repetition contrasts the notices about psyches' reactions and the notices about psyches' actions. This turns particular procedures into particular memories.
Particular memories, therefore, are particular procedures to generate the mentioned meanings in the context of the biographical texturing of an existentiality's ontological consistency. Although procedures always differ, their meanings can be shared. How to pinpoint at any later time, in order to reimagine some memory, which these possibilities were?
These operatory possibilities are of course filtered through the difference in time resolu-tion between the time acuity with which the episode was lived and the time acuity which one is installed on at recall time. This filtering compels to progress in imagination prob-ing a range of such differences until one arrives to reimagine the set of operatory possi-bilities established by the sensoperceptual contents of such a past moment. This set provides the famous "associative links" that glue special groups of interarticulated memories. Sharing in relativistic dilation is thus an essential component of memories "association." Nothing to wonder about, actually, because the sharing is required to spot, as a unique performance, the operations that constitute every calling to mind.
These grouped memory elements to be "associatedly" recalled share in the time acuity under which their extramental occurrences had been resolved. This is why one can ar-rive to recall a particular object that compounds in a past situation, from the reconstruc-tion of other elements in the situation's group delineated with its same relativistic dilation or, instead, contemporary elements memorized from a different time acuity - but in the latter case an additional operation is to be carried out.
The additional operation should transform the original situation, e. g., into paying atten-tion to components primitively unattended in the memorized situation. One first recon-structs the biophysical time acuity in which one was when one lived the episode to be recalled: for example, awake or asleep; focusing on the episode's accomplishment or only marginally attending it, detached perhaps by grief; stuporose, or chemically influ-enced. Like moving a finger, the semovient operation modifies the brain state. In the case of a ground-gaining retrieval, it puts the brain into the states outlined below, which the circumstanced psyche reacts to intonatively by imagining the autobiographical epi-sode. Then, within such a time acuity, one attentionally reclusters the elements, re-grouping them into new accidental units until finding some component of the sought situation, thereby finding the operatory possibilities that define in it the searched for memory.
These operatory possibilities again become available as the object that they conserve (the past situation) is reimagined. That is to say, the availing of this particular set of op-eratory possibilities defines the searched-for memory and such operatory definition squares with the "associated" context in the time-resolution reference frame. This squar-ing of one's sedimented operationality with the reimagined elements (and not any spe-cial emotion serving to tag recognition) is what provides recognition to the reimagined memory as one's own, namely that an episode is being imagined because it has already been happening to one earlier: as a recall, then, and not as a fancy.
Definitely such a resource is fallible. With a little experimental ingenuity it may be cheated. Nevertheless, in evolutionarily typical situations it is reliable since it depends on the real system of Piagetian-equilibrable operations built by probing the reactions of similar situations to one's semovience.
Yet, to be voluntarily recalled, biographical experiences must have been sensed; but, had they been sensed with deficient force of imposition, they could not inchoate their understanding in praxical terms. Put differently, had they been originally sensed out of the focus of attention, their full categorization by the concerned individual was ham-pered. This, later, hinders forever their recall. Namely, for reimagining them, a large amount of operational categorization is to be added that did not enter the original ex-periences and, if at all appended, is rightly recognized as purely fanciful, or non-original. This is why the head-concussion clinic shows, as mentioned, that in contrast with the gradual reinstatement of pretrauma memories unrememberable as they fell in the retro-grade segment of amnesia, no recoveries are observed of the experiences unrenewable as they came under the anterograde segment of amnesia.
Along these lines, noergy enters in the conditions of possibility for recall. With it, noergy brings in non-personal (or, mechanical) issues about time acuity. Before lack of fine-enough time acuity lays sensed events into unresolvability, subresolvability comes as noergy debilitation. The life experiences that one leaves go past with such enfeebled impositive force - as forgettable, undealt with minutiae out of the focus of attention - remain thus unrelated with the biographical thread attended to. In other words, they re-main deprived of the workability hermeneusis: namely, of their noûs poieetikós construal in terms of what one is capable of doing with them through one's own mental maturity and means at hand. This workability hermeneusis would have been needed to catego-rize each of such lived experiences in terms of one's semovient operations which by en-acting causally efficient actions turn its schema cognoscible, so as to effortlessly localize it in the simultaneized sequence of one's past doings and, therewith, reimagine it in vol-untary recall.
Why is Sleeping Right After Learning Better for Retention than Remaining Awake? In sum, the organization of memories reflects the reference frame in which the original ex-periences were lived. This reference frame determined the time resolution of the re-ferred-to extramental occurrences. As shown by dissociative disorders and hypnotic suggestion as well as regular experience, one can alternate recall from groups, for ex-ample, one can pass from memories of awake life to memories of oneiric life. Yet this passing is an additional operation - one not called for by the recalled content itself.
Although the pace of the observer's "own time" - i.e., in any attentional state, the not in-tervalic but operational resolution of one's own operations after a psyche has become innerly differentiated into them, or textured by them; see below - never changes, oneiric experiences are lived on a time dilation (which stretches any observed outer intervals or dilutes the pace of the observed extramental courses, including those of brain proc-esses) differing from that in awake state. So, regarding oneiric experiences, a previous learning achieved in awake life (before leaving its items aside the attentional focus, then going into more generalized inattention and sleep, and then dreaming) remains in a dif-ferent reference frame. Each reference frame allows reimagining the experiences from the other frames with improper noergy or force of imposition, namely unattended. Thus sleep prevents the ensuing awake life from interfering - turning elusive the study mate-rials learned just before the sleep interlude - so much as the ensuing awake life inter-feres on study materials learnt without sleep interlude. Whence people tend to remem-ber things better if they sleep after learning them.
This occurs as interference affects organized and well-recognized contents but not their brute mémoire or unrequested raw memory, a passive remembering in which events come to mind unbidden, or intrusively. Retention and recognition happen in such blocks, whose organizational schemes are operationally deployed and need the said additional operation in order to integrate contents lived in different frames. Or, memories are re-tained and recognized in blocks whose compounding operations are grasped as a uni-fied performance, and every block includes the contents of experience had either in the focus of attention or, with less operational recognition, outside it.
When the recall is being done from the same original time dilation, these unrequested contents may reappear as brute mémoire. (As explained above, the unattended ele-ments in it often become undistinguishable from fancy, contaminating the recognition of the originally attended ones.) Similarly, other contents fade away also in block. This makes the orientation reactions to surprise and the background interceptions detrimen-tal, causing the unexpected failure to rediscover the thread of thoughts that a minute ago one was fluently developing, a feature so much familiar to schizoids as affrighting for anxious lecturers. Likewise, conversely, the better retention of materials studied be-fore sleeping builds on the lack of interference from the same motion frame. Since re-calling demands being made from a time dilation that matches the original acquisition, any crossing the contents' borders to include materials from unattended sectors, or from oneiric experiences, demands from the remembering person a special operation to transport the reimagining process into the same reference frame in which the memories were originally made.
What is Imparted When One Pays Attention to Something? That which is contributed is the operationalizing of its sensations. In other words, one thereby applies, to a sector of one's sensory field, the acquired system of equilibrable operations sedimented in one's ontic-ontological consistency. This system allows to operationally categorize sensory contents with some particular detail. This, in the case of memories, is the mentioned workability hermeneusis, but applies also on sensations stirred by the ongoing activity of the sense organs.
Such a system of equilibrable operations, which one avails of all at once by their sedi-mentation in one's reality, integrates the current ontic-ontological consistency of the cir-cumstanced existentiality and makes known to her what she could do with the entities referred to by those sensations. Instead, the sensations outside the attended-to focus remain less detailedly categorized (namely, less "operationalized"), although operation-alizable, which means operationally categorizable. This, had it taken place, would mean that these sensations were put into the focus of attention and remain no longer in its fringe. Those sensations that stay in the less operationally categorized fringe nonethe-less receive a preliminary, automatic categorical distinction as, without mental discrimi-nation, it is provided by nonconscious activity of neural analyzers, but if the attentional focus never worked on them they stay as almost unretrievable memories (anterograde amnesia). They are forgotten and, inasmuch as uncategorized in operational terms, are almost unrememberable because cannot be defined and identified in operational terms (infantile amnesia). Away of the current focus of attention, this fringe is continuous with the availability of operationally categorized rememberings that are to be localized in the quasi-spatial distribution of acquired differentiations and, then, reimagined in voluntary recall.
Does the overlap of time resolutions automatically generate recall? No, because the evolutionarily selected development is efficient and most psyches do not stay for long untextured. In most cases, before long bodily interactions become functional, and the psyche starts to differentiate her initiatives as linked with her reactive intonations arising at her undergoing the surrounding's feedback to such initiatives. (This feedback from the psyche's surroundings includes the bodily's feedback, as much early in maturational terms as in the fetal exploration of finger sucking in primates). So, with the successive developmental periods, her living reality becomes differentiated into the system of her possible, equilibrable semovient operations. The structure of this system of operations establishes how she sees the sensations being stirred by the surroundings and the sen-sations that she might herself stir to reimagine her memories.
Had an existentiality's ontic-ontological consistency remained untextured (tabula rasa, as the untextured condition is traditionally referred to in Aristotelianisms and Philo), no possible change in mental contents could arise from changing the magnitude of the time acuity with which, at any rate, she (such a tabula rasa) could not discern within herself anything in semovient-operational terms. In other words, coarsening or either refining her time acuity (by way of varying the speed of her moving operative localizations, as this speed is counted from some outer reference frame) would not vary any experience (which always is experience of changes in herself) referable to processes in the outer frame - because, this existentiality still being a tabula rasa, such outer processes are not yet reflected into her mental differentiations. She is already not-another mind, i.e. not-another's experiencing reality, and is apt to sense and move, but stays sensibly as well as intellectually undifferentiated. She not yet has acquired contents: no acquired content contributes to her buildup.
Yet, with development, a mind's ontic-ontological consistency becomes textured into some particular shape. She finds herself innerly "differentiated." This differentiation in operational terms, or intellectual differentiation or mind's live texture, is supplied by the sequential sedimentation of her past causal involvements ("biography") whose experi-enced reactions cannot elapse. Thus the experienced reactions of her past causal in-volvements stay simultaneized ("memory") while successively added with new bio-graphical experiences (Jakob's frente matesomnémico de registro; for didactics, Jakob's followers sometimes compare it with a - time-thin - onion nonetheless developing its structure with leaves of diverse thickness). After such developmental texturing comes about, it becomes possible for its causal-process acuity to match or not to match the time acuity proper for referring a particular set of mental differentiations to processes of biological relevance occurring in the other reference frame.
In the same way, the time acuity of the equilibrable operatory system might, or might not, allow the application of the available semovient operations to the differentiations that become revealed as the current time acuity varies. And the inchoate, "embryonic" or very preliminary application of those semovient operations - with their possible devel-opment in view - is what identifies, categorizes and recognizes all memories. Thus a matching with the current time acuity does not mechanically generate recall. It does this only inasmuch as the proper matching of the time acuities, those of the original acquisi-tion and its current knowledge, allows applying the system of equilibrable operations in which at this time the existentiality's ontological consistency consists.
What is Voluntary Recall? Voluntary or conative recall is the semovient act of retrieving a particular memory originally acquired at a time in the past. On recognizing its opera-tional structure, such a memory is reimagined by setting up, the most likely with inter-vention of the frontal lobes, a dynamic electroneurobiological state whose tuning nor-mally involves the hippocampi, the dorsomedial thalamic nuclei, and other brain struc-tures. These, if damaged or lost, might occasionally be learnt to be replaced with other cerebral tracts, though less efficiently and after hard exercitation.
The said electroneurobiological state is first to match the time acuity which the memory was originally experienced with, then to generate, in the circumstanced mind, intonative reactions structured to match the particular memory as it was previously identified in her visio generalis (when selecting it for recall), then to modify the reimagination process upon operative equilibria that conserve the particular memory as object of these modifi-cations, recognizable through them. Assuming that some pharmaceuticals have poten-tial effects and therapeutic use on learning and memory deficits is, thus, assuming that those drugs may improve the brain control of the regional speeds of noematic causal carriers, attenuating or protecting against the brain dysfunction - what only improperly lets labeling those drugs "cognitive enhancers."
Conative or voluntary recall does not differ in enactive mechanism from the semovient act of moving a finger, as we saw. Yet conative recall entails more complexity in the production of the physiological conditions to handle the segment of the "bodily schema" that, through sedimentation of the existentiality's past causal involvements, includes the relations of the mentioned particular memory with the remaining differentiations (which comprise those of the finger) in the existentiality's experience-textured ontic-ontological consistency.
Through as yet unknown mechanisms, injury to the hippocampi and dorsomedial tha-lamic nuclei is observed to put new experiences into the fringe of low noergy, which comprises the not-to-be-retained perceptions, such as the mentioned ones of passersby and vehicles when one is driving. This allows the contemporary handling of these ex-periences (thereby one steers clear of traffic accidents) while hindering their subsequent recall (anterograde amnesia). It yet does not hinder that other brain structures remain in conditions of generating, though multiple combinations, the dynamic electroneurobi-ological state proper to reimagine the memories that, in contrast, were originally ac-quired in the focus of attention - thus shunning retrograde amnesia.
Retrograde amnesia, which always is a failure in remembering the so-called long-term memories, instead takes place when injury to less specific or architectonically more ba-sic brain structures disrupts the fine control of the electroneurobiological state's dynam-ics, preventing to set it up as to produce in the circumstanced psyche the reactions rec-ognizable as matching the visio generalis of the particular memory sought to be reimag-ined. Short-term memory does not require that the hippocampi, dorsomedial thalamic nuclei or any related structures build a dynamic electroneurobiological state in reaction to which the psyche reimagines an old memory, this being why the loss of both hippo-campi does not impair short-term memory.
As full, reviviscent recall is reimagining, it involves both active and passive roles impor-tant to tell between. Sensing is always passive, whether the intonative reaction under-went by the psyche was caused by extramentality or by the psyche's operations. And those intellectual operations generating the brain states that intonatively flesh such a mnesic reimagination are of course active, like those intellectual operations generating a finger waving that makes some signal. The fact that the gnoseological apprehension of these "of course active" operations is a noetic act might mislead one into mistaking it as wholly active, while in fact it passively undergoes being determined into cognoscitively apprehending some such combination of operations (that generate a recall) rather than any other. Just as one may passively notice the involuntary growth of one's hair, one also may passively notice the effect on the brain of one's voluntary acts. And, before this effect on the brain is produced, one may passively notice the yet-to-be-enacted opera-tory combination as one's gnoseological object. This apprehension is thus not the termi-nation of the psyche's act of shaping her object, but another going through her being passively determined. Our psyche mentally behaves as it was developmentally learnt through bodily behavior: as she operatively shapes the mental content which she origi-nates, she becomes bound to understand it passively. In this act she ontically propor-tions itself toward undergoing the intellection of her own act; in regard to this intellection she is entirely passive, just as she also is in regard to any sensation whether mentally or extramentally caused: she cannot cognoscitively apprehend any other thing than what she really is to operate. This apprehension is that of the operative sequence learnt as the one capable of shaping the object, a shaping sequence that is apprehended as a whole and inasmuch as repeatable: that is to say, inasmuch as reimaginable ("remem-berable") at any time by repeating the whole sequence. It is thus noticed as able to put the brain in states that produce the mental intonative reactions fleshing sensorially the object (which may be a remembered episode, biographically unique) without any loss of the said repeatability or generalization.
What is Gnoseological Apprehension? The above outlined facts offer a stark contrast with the Peripatetic understanding of knowledge as a sector of metabolism, a view of knowledge that leaves aside both its cognizableness and this cognizableness' unbar-terability. By its referring to different realities through one broad term, this Aristotle-stemmed understanding is the source of the familiar conflation of "knowledge" and "in-formation."
The Peripatetic tradition in gnoseology understands "knowledge" as such acceptance in the knower - of the "Form" supplying full inner-and-outer shaping or "conformation" to another thing - that does not thereby trans-form the knower into the known thing, an as-similation which instead occurs in other metabolic incorporations, for example, as food becomes the fed organism. In this way, by knowing one escapes transforming oneself into, say, apple in (just) becoming acquainted with an apple, despite receiving in oneself the apple-forming Form. This standing back, or ability to receive the Form yet escaping the pernicious transformation that it might otherwise bring about, is knowledge's distinc-tive feature in the metabolic descriptions of the Peripatetic tradition. It includes a vigor-ous branch of Scholastics active since the thirteenth century and non-confessional scholars such as Maturana, Varela, and followers who call knowledge "cognition" and conflate it with "life." Clearly this classical, informatic conception of knowledge as a bio-logical topic ("Biologie de la Connaissance") neither intends nor approaches the issue of what the gnoseological apprehension is; that is, what the cognoscitive event or noetic act does itself consist in.
As a result, the Peripatetic understanding of knowledge has been extremely valuable as a conceptual tool, precisely because it applies to non-empsyched organizations such as the sensitive soul of corals and worms, or the compliant mutual accommodation of the "castes" of eusocial insects, as well as to the mental contents differentiated by existen-tialities and, also, to the informatic content of data processing machines - whose con-ceptual developments have been of particular importance to our current life style. "Knows," so, means that some passive entity, which may or may not be an existentiality, "acquires notices" or "gets informed." Yet this Peripatetic-derived metabolic conception of knowledge, despite its soundness and worth for specific uses, leaves aside what pre-cisely matters for understanding knowledge in both ontic and existential terms. This re-linquishing squares with the conflation of nonempsyched organisms and circumstanced existentialities in the Peripatetic concept of sensitive soul.
In actual fact, when nonempsyched realities "acquire notices" or "get informed" there is shaping, or conformational action, but not gnoseological apprehension. In contrast, the acts of knowledge elicited by circumstanced existentialities, or gnoseological apprehen-sion found in nature, apply onto the reactive intonation and unintonated proportioning of these very circumstanced existentialities. Gnoseological apprehension can operate, that is, can intellectually get the change in mental contents, without using the operatory un-derstanding - an avenue that yields the "nude" intonation. Yet there are others. The dif-ferentiations or mental contents of all the circumstanced existentialities are made up of structureless elements coming from this sensational intonation, plus structural elements; the latter come from the gnoseological apprehension and intrinsic observability of one's efficient actions in context or from the neurobiological distribution that brings the said sensational intonations about. Thereby semovient observers who distinguish, among a diversity of previously met structureless variations, such a structureless reactive intona-tion of themselves and its structure-generating boundaries, may developmentally learn to recognize and directly intend the extramentalities whose interaction causally-efficiently enacts a particular set of those intonations.
To barely hint a key point: this application of the knowing act can take place because time does course for structurally-reacting causal exchanges but does not course for structurelessly-reacting ones. The causal exchanges yielding structural reactions, say the collisions and relocation of sand grains under a blowing wind, transform things in ex-tramental dispersivity; such causal exchanges do this by spatially translocating or re-shaping things (i. e., reshaping situations or reshaping these things) as the previous state of affairs loses all actuality because the discrete carriers of causal action become such effect themselves. The resulting state of affairs, so, still keeps causal efficiency to nomically continue the causal series. Instead the causal exchanges yielding structure-less reactions intonate existentialities. These causal exchanges modify the structureless intonations in existentialities who differentiate those intonations and whose sequences of modifications do not lose actuality, a state of affairs that does not keep any causal ef-ficiency to continue a causal series. As empirically found, therefore, the sensible gnose-ological apprehension - that is, the act of knowing what is sensed, or sensory noetic act - is thus the feature of efficiently causal interactions whereby the enacted structureless reactions intonate the reacting entity on ranges whose manifestation exhausts the causal efficiency. And the non-sensible or intellectual gnoseological apprehension is on-tically the same with the sole difference that no specific intonation gets made to phe-nomenize.
Assuming a plausible understanding of causation, how can privately accessible mental events cause or be caused by non-privately accessible physical events? This question is the causal relationship's one, the issue that bears on the interaction between mental and physical events. "Physical" in this corny dichotomy should only mean everything whose causal courses run on discreteness of efficient action, a feature not expressed by the term "mental." Yet it is not difficult to see how mental events, despite their being unlocated and often unformable (shapeless) in the space of the laboratory as well as lacking in size and mass, could nonetheless cause or be caused by extramentally spa-tial physical events located and possessed with mass-energy. How can they interact? A short answer is: not through their ontological condition, but through their ontic consis-tency - which phenomenisms are steadfastly purposed to snub. Let me spell it out here.
Privately accessibility or lack of it are unrelated with the performance of this causal process. More to the point, observation shows extramental space's derivativeness. It is observed in the formation of new space in preexisting extensions of older space, a process now thought to occur everywhere, as well between galaxies as inside our brain and body - themselves more than 99.999999999 percent empty space. The basic physical determinations that generate space appear as unlocalizable and, as a rule, the origin of actions results unlocalizable in space: as well for extramental changes coming from psyches as for those coming from any physical field. No source of efficient causal-ity is confinable to a spatial location. These determinations not even run on discreteness of efficient action, so that in the present state of the science one must say that the eclo-sion of every physical subparticle is not physical itself, at least if one wishes to keep in the sentence the same meaning for both uses of "physical"; a related point is familiar in big-bang discussions. (Big bang, a key concept in cosmological theories that aspire to model the astrophysical evolution and detected expansion of the observable universe, is a swift outflow of all its material - unpacking it from a teensy, physically minimal dot of the heaviest, physically maximal density and largest energy - that while evolving gener-ates space, whether or not amid preexisting space as we nowadays observe, and so provides itself with the room to bloat.) What psyches or existentialities do, in establishing the local potentials of the field whose carriers psyches utilize as the first causal link for triggering the sequence of nomic extramental effects, is the same that fields do when from an unlocalizable set of determinations they make themselves or another segre-gated field to eclose more, or either less, of its force carriers at every spot of volume, thereby changing the spatial distribution of their local potential.
In this way all interactions occur. Therefore, mind-brain interaction is by no means more thorny or problematic than the field generation of variations in local potentials; the latter simply is still less well known in brain-mind studies. And the reverse process, not yet more familiar in physics studies, is also illustratively observed in the said brain-mind re-search: as commented above, extramental causal efficiency is found to work out in psy-chisms just intonative reactions, not causing psychisms - whose sole operative pres-ence is spatially localized - to be affected in such a way as to instrumentally transmit the extramental efficiency with mechanical effects. As an aftermath, the space localiza-tion of minds (not of psyches' local causal exchanges with extramentality, that is, the places of termination where a psyche's causal action inheres in extramentality, also called the presence of her immediate operation, or operative presence; but, the space localization of the ontic consistency of mental contents, which always are acquired dif-ferentiations of a certain psyche) as well as the space localization of the field determina-tions that cause every virtual or real elementary particle to materialize where it in fact ecloses, is inexistent. Both of them occur foregoing the conditions that make space eventuate. The really problematical issue is why an existentiality or psyche ecloses to sense and move her brain rather than another.
What is restored on recovery from ordinary sleep, hibernation, general anesthesia, "ab-sence," fainting, comas, or vegetative states? A pair of essential components of every psyche cannot be supplied by the brain that becomes hers (rather than availing, instead, to another person). Namely, for every subjective existence, psyche, or personal existen-tiality found in nature, her ontic consistency and her cadacualtez (defined hereafter) cannot be provided by the brain itself or by its functioning.
Her ontic consistency, that is every psyche's semovient-sensing makeup, is the extra-mental actuality availed by each personal existence. This extramental actuality is also availed by her intramentality which - finite existentialities being plural and their respec-tive actions being kept mutually apart by extramentalities - never relinquishes its extra-mental condition and could never exhaust itself in sheer appearing or phenomenicity (as, in contrast, phenomenisms assert, true to their onticity-emptying belief that psyches and mental contents are, by definition, only and no more than subjective).
In turn, her cadacualtez manifests itself as the constitutive determination of each finite existentiality to both causally affect and be causally affected by no other parcel of nature - namely, such and such a brain and its bodily and outer circumstances - than the par-cel that, because of this determination, acquired the status that is called "her." It pre-vents pronouncing psyches "productive creations" whether of the mere complexity (hod-ologies) or the mere simplicity (immateriality). The bodily dispositions that enable her body to stay empsyched by an existentiality (aliveness), or prevent it (death of that body), cannot discriminate between existentialities. Yet the neurodynamical patterns arising from anatomofunctional complexity, supplied by differential recruitment of ele-mentary (molecular) neurobiological mechanisms, when they get eventually transduced into potentials of the immediately reactionable-to field, do not indiscriminately enter ex-perience.
They do not do it except if they belong with the brain organ that the experience of the case is circumstanced to, whose actions in turn work on no other organ to start extra-mental causal chains. It it thus apparent that, even apart from (i. e. not counting, and re-fraining from considering) the nomic causal interactions involving body as well as mind which consistently vary the elements composing their successive states, existentialities or psyches are in no way unrelated to their respective bodies. In fact, sustaining this re-lationship, rather than enacting some executable/forbearable operation involving psy-chosomatic concourse, is the primary act of every body that might be empsyched (see Ávila and Crocco 1996.) In other words, cadacualtez is one's determination as not-another enabling one to sustain constitutive causal exchanges with a fixed parcel of na-ture, rather than one's existentiality having, instead, eclosed to any other constitutive brain or circumstance. Its observation shows that everything is not made of the same set of truly elementary types of components, as a giant meccano.
In the outlined context, all these particulars afford important insights for clinical practice. They are especially notable in regard to one of the central issues in the neurobiology of the (so-called) impaired consciousness. There, the outlined factual landscape is not consistent with the envisaged strategy of "activating engrams."
But engrams are an ideological fact, not a scientific fact. Such engrams are notional creatures, belonging in the Æschylus-Plato fantastic view of memories as extramental sources of mental retention. On account of engrams, the causal continuity of two facts of an individual's experience, namely any original experience and its later remembering, is attributed to an intervention external to the experience so as to elude recognizing, to the individuals' experience, efficient causal aptitude to operate by itself, specially in time. Engrams are thus "bodily impressions" envisioned as tagged extramental settings of mental data, stored out of the mind - a nonsemovient mind whose ontology, thanks to the engrams's purifying role, remains unspoiled with sensual and contingent experi-ences.
Engrams are variably imagined, as complete material traces to realistically reproduce the original experience, for example by Plato (-427 to -347), or as fragmentary functional ones to reconstruct it, if somehow confusely. The latter is the case of, for instance, Des-cartes (1596-1650) and Malebranche (1638-1715), who viewed memories as patterned motions of animal spirits through brain pores, later reenacted though running the risk of mutual interference. Engrams, however, are always impersonal and intrinsically unre-lated to one's developmentally acquired systems of equilibrable semovient operations.
These engrams etched and re-sketched on the brain do not exist. It does not matter if their nonexistence flabbergasts some neuroscientists in cultures whose science, com-monsense, and language expressions assumed their reality for at least three millennia. Engrams are a purely fictional concept. It is conclusively shown by the amnesiacs' recu-perations, which are incompatible with a "data-losing-and-recovering" naive construal of autobiographical memories as foreign to one's particular set of choices for equilibrable semovient operations.
Engrams not even could exist, since memories (rather than the non-memorizable series of extramental events, whose causation is too tight to be usefully memorized) acquire their "coarse graining," and on it their forms recognizable in terms of one´s possible op-erations, from the dilation of the (otherwise unresolvable) sequence of their causal mak-ing. This sequence is stretched by the very relativistic transframing that provides bio-logically adaptive acuity to the depiction of their episodes. Only in this way can episodic and praxical memories be availed in minds' ontology, namely in the ontic consistency or extramental actuality of each personal existence, where those mental contents inhere. Rememberings cannot linger in the brain "stored" as "data," namely in the condition in which their episodes occurred before their sequence was transframed, because their transframing is unrepeatable: it occurs as each segment of a biographical sequence comes about, and thus takes place just on one occasion for each remembered episode.
Memories or rememberings thus differ from and contrast with their mnesic reimagina-tion, an ability to reconstruct them as cerebrally provided present sensations and, so, profit by their modifiability and ensuing capability of generating new experiences, in turn memorizable. (Mnesic reimaginations also differ from every other new sensation in that their apperception preexists rather than follows their arrival on the scene.) This ability, like flying and deep diving, was probably selected on Earth a number of times - al-though it took a paleontologically recent part in the natural selection of the psychological governance of cerebral performance.
Such a brain-depending ability - mente fingere per cerebrum - makes a significant con-trast with memories. While the preservation of memories is an effect of the absence of time course, their modifiable reimagining exploits the presence of brain structures. Thus this issue of "impaired consciousness," for clinical practice, amounts to controlling the tissue's electroneurobiological activity that gates the proper acuity, so "coupling" or "switching on" the body in order to "awaken" the finite psyche who - on other grounds - remains incumbent rather than any other.
The author heartily thanks to Mario Crocco, who contributed to our tradition the original discover-ies in relativistic biophysics and neurobiology of memory, attention, and sleep referred to in this essay, as well as to Antoine Courban MD, Anatomy Dept., St. Joseph University in Beirut (Leba-non), for their revision of the piece and editing of my concepts; an earlier version was revised by Paul Bains of Murdoch University (Australia). I remain most grateful for their intelligent analyses and valuable remarks; any conceptual wrongdoing perpetrated with them is of course mine. Sev-eral sections of the text are borrowed with autorization from classroom materials by Prof. Crocco. An earlier version of this essay, including further topics, was prepared in December 1999 for a seminar. It was presented in March 2000 at the Hellenic-Argentinian Meeting of Psychiatry organ-ized by the Hellenic Psychiatric Association jointly with the Asociación Argentina de Psiquíatras, and thereafter (April 20, 2000) communicated to the National Academy of Sciences of the Argen-tine Republic.